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ABSTRACT
Three studies reexamined the findings of Leary, Landel, and Patton (1996), by
investigating how various domains of self-esteem (SE) are related to the tendency to
share the emotions with others following an embarrassing event. In Study 1, participants
completed measures of dominance, status, prestige, mate value, and global SE, and also
performed an embarrassing singing task. Following the singing task, some participants
were given the chance to communicate their embarrassment to the researcher, whereas
others were not. It was found that dominant individuals experienced significantly less
embarrassment after conveying their embarrassment to the researcher than if their
feelings remained private. In contrast, low-dominance individuals’ levels of self-reported
embarrassment did not differ whether or not they had the opportunity to express their
feelings to others. Study 2, which involved a large exploratory factor analysis, improved
upon the existing measures of dominance, status, and prestige. Study 3 was an attempt to
replicate Study 1, using the improved measures of dominance, status, and prestige.
However, the study failed to duplicate the finding that the motivated expression of
embarrassment was related to dominance. Instead, it was found that self-reported
embarrassment was related to status and global SE. The relative merit of Study 1 and
Study 3 for understanding individual differences in reactions to embarrassment are
discussed.

STATUS, DOMINANCE, OR PRESTIGE?

INTRODUCTION

Individuals differ widely in their susceptibility to embarrassment. Whereas some
appear practically immune to the emotion, others become easily embarrassed by silly
social mishaps. Differences also arise in how individuals respond to feelings of
embarrassment. Whereas some are able to laugh off or joke about their own
embarrassment, others deal with a crippling fear of awkward social interactions. If
embarrassment can have such a significant impact on the social life, it is important to
understand how the structure of personality is related to the emotion of embarrassment.
The present studies seek to understand such individual differences in the experience of
and reaction to embarrassing feelings.
Embarrassment as a Self-Conscious Emotion
Emotional experiences are extremely personal, yet their causes and ramifications
are largely social. For no group of feelings is this truer than the so-called “self-conscious
emotions,” such as embarrassment, shame, and guilt. Each of these emotions is
experienced when people feel they are being judged, either by self or others (Fisher &
Tangney, 1995). One of the earliest definitions of embarrassment, written by Goffman
(1967), declared that embarrassment occurred because of “unfulfilled expectations” (p.
105). According to Goffman, people know how to behave, given their own social
identities, and they feel embarrassed when they have failed to maintain that social
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standard. In a recent review o f research on embarrassment, Keltner and Buswell (1997)
identify embarrassment as being distinct from shame and guilt, based on triggering events
and physiological responses. Embarrassment is caused by the violation of social
conventions, including physical mishaps such as tripping, or uncomfortable social
interactions such as public speaking. In contrast, shame involves failing to live up to the
expectations of oneself or of others, perhaps by hurting someone’s feelings, and guilt is
incited by actions such as cheating, which involve going against one’s own moral rules.
Sabini, Garvey, and Hall (2001) take a slightly different view of the distinction
between shame and embarrassment. In a series of studies, they reported that individuals
experience shame when they personally think a flaw in the self has been revealed, but
experience embarrassment when they think others believe a flaw in the self has been
revealed. For example, spilling wine on a white carpet causes embarrassment because it
makes others believe a person is clumsy, but does not necessarily make the spiller believe
he or she is clumsy. The debate between Sabini and colleagues’ theory of a distinction
between embarrassment and shame based on perceived vs. actual flaws, and the theory
that hinges the difference on the violations of social conventions vs. moral rules (Keltner
& Buswell, 1997) is ongoing.
The varying physiological and behavioral responses associated with selfconscious feelings also help in teasing apart the emotions. For example, embarrassment
displays involve gaze aversion, a downward movement of the head, smiling, and often
blushing, whereas expressions of shame involve only a downcast head and gaze (Keltner
& Buswell, 1996). On the other hand, a guilty expression is less clearly distinguishable
from pained or sympathetic expressions, and when shown photographs of prototypical
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embarrassment, shame, and guilt displays, people can reliably distinguish between
embarrassment and shame, but are unable to identify guilty expressions consistently
(Keltner & Buswell, 1996). Recent studies have begun to demonstrate that
embarrassment is a universally recognized emotion. In a study by Haidt and Keltner
(1999), participants in the United States and India were able to distinguish facial
expressions of embarrassment from displays of shame and amusement.
The ways in which people respond to the emotions of shame, guilt, and
embarrassment offer another valuable tool for distinguishing among the constructs.
Studies of personal narratives have revealed that participants believe the social responses
to embarrassment to be shorter in duration, as well as more light-hearted, often involving
humor and smiling (Miller & Tangney, 1994). In contrast, the experience of shame tends
to be much more negative and prolonged, involving anger, disgust, and attempts to take
actions such as apologizing in an effort to dispel the shameful feelings.
However, not all emotion researchers have viewed embarrassment as being a
distinct emotion. Darwin (1872) considered the significance of the blush in his book The
Expression o f the Emotions in Man and Animals, but made no mention of embarrassment.
Fessler (1999), an anthropologist, sought to adopt a universal way of defining emotions,
something that has been widely attempted by psychologists, but largely avoided by
members of his field. In his search for universal emotional displays, Fessler focused on
the emotions of shame and pride, neglecting embarrassment other than to note that it is
seen as a distinct emotion only in Western cultures. Fessler identified two forms of
shame, one that results simply from being in the presence of higher-status others, and one
that is felt after a social rule or norm has been violated and the violation is known to
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someone else. It is easy to see how Fessler’s second form of shame is related to previous
descriptions of embarrassment (Goffman, 1967). To this point, all of these accounts focus
on the antecedents o f embarrassment, but determining the function of embarrassment
offers another useful tool for determining whether or not it is a distinct emotion.
The Function o f Embarrassment
Embarrassment appears to be a unique emotion as defined by its prototypical
display; however a distinct emotion is also defined, in part, by its distinct function. In a
review of the literature on the moral emotions, Haidt (2003) argued that the “selfconscious emotions seem designed to help people navigate the complexities of fitting into
groups without triggering the contempt, anger, and disgust of others” (p.859).
Researchers such as Frijda (1986) emphasized the interpersonal functions of emotions.
Fridja discussed the behavioral responses to feelings such as shame and embarrassment
as comprising a category of interactive expressions. The most important function of these
emotional displays is to influence the behavior o f others. For example, the submissive
behaviors that are part of the embarrassment display, including gaze aversion and the
hanging of the head, are meant to directly influence the behaviors of a more dominant
individual by demonstrating that the embarrassed individual is aware an interpersonal
error has been made.
This is one prominent explanation of the function of embarrassment; that is, the
emotion serves as an appeasement display. Researchers have proposed that displays of
embarrassment may serve to pacify others who observe the embarrassment-inducing
behavior (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). The appeasement theory of embarrassment is based
on studies of appeasement behavior in other species. Nonhuman appeasement displays
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include actions such as averting the eyes and assuming a closed, submissive posture, and
bear close resemblance to human appeasement displays. Among humans, these displays
serve to restore social bonds that have been threatened by a transgression. Keltner,
Young, and Buswell (1997) reviewed the findings from a series of studies in which
participants were presented with photos of individuals demonstrating prototypical
emotional displays, including embarrassment and shame, and the participants were asked
to imagine that the individuals in the photos had made some kind o f social transgression.
The participants then rated how much amusement, antipathy, and sympathy they felt in
response to the photo. It was found that the participants felt more amusement after
viewing the embarrassed photos and more sympathy following the shame pictures.
Embarrassment and shame thus appear to be unique emotions that evoke different
conciliatory feelings in observers.
Miller and Leary (1992) argued that the effects of the embarrassment display
affect both the observer and the individual experiencing the emotion. Because of the
uniqueness of the embarrassment display, it is recognizable to the observer,
demonstrating that the individual who has committed the social transgression is
experiencing negative feelings. For the individual experiencing the embarrassment, the
private sensations are so negative and uncomfortable that the individual is motivated to
behave prosocially in an effort to relieve the immediate feelings of discomfort. The
individual may then even be motivated to act in such a manner as to avoid experiencing
the same feelings in the future.
One major indication that an individual is embarrassed can be blushing. Blushing
is a common, albeit usually undesirable and uncomfortable physiological response,
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involving the reddening of the face and neck. Leary and Meadows (1991) proposed that
blushing is an involuntary response indicating humility, which is meant to mitigate
potential negative evaluations of the blusher by others and to ensure that the individual
remains socially included. Much as in the appeasement theory of embarrassment, the
blush is a reaction that relates largely to evaluating and maintaining status within a group.
Leary and Meadows found that blushing frequency was correlated with measures such as
self-esteem and interaction anxiety, which tap into a person’s levels of comfort and
success in interpersonal interactions.
Another correlational study investigated the relationship between
embarrassability, blushing, and dominance. Halberstadt and Green (1993) tested the
placation theory o f blushing as outlined by Leary and Meadows (1991), hypothesizing
that if the blush serves to appease others, then those who blush often should be high in
submissiveness. Participants completed measures of blushing propensity,
embarrassability, and dominance. Dominance was found to be inversely correlated with
both blushing propensity, or tendency to blush, and embarrassability, offering support for
the placation theory of blushing. This relationship between dominance and
embarrassability suggests that an individual’s social status could be critically important in
influencing the experiences of and reactions to embarrassing situations.
Status and Embarrassment
Other researchers have attempted to experimentally manipulate status and to
gauge the impact of status on individuals’ reactions to an embarrassing situation. As part
of a study conducted by Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, & Wetter (1990), high- or lowstatus participants were led to believe that they had spilled a cup of cola onto the valuable

or inexpensive belongings of a confederate. High-status participants were asked to
conduct interviews on behalf of an absent graduate student researcher, whereas low-status
participants were told that they would be interviewed by an experimenter. Just prior to
the beginning of the interview, a confederate posing as either the interviewer or
interviewee distracted the participant, while an experimenter in the next room pulled a
string to upset a drink cup that had been left on the table onto the confederate’s
possessions. The researchers’ videotaped the participants’ reactions to the spill and coded
the behaviors for verbal helping behaviors such as saying, “What can I do?” and
behavioral helping such as drying the items. It was found that when the consequences of
the spill were severe (i.e. the ruined property was valuable), there was no difference in
amount remedial effort extended by the high- and low-status participants. In contrast,
when the damaged belongings were inexpensive, low-status participants extended more
effort to compensate for the spill. The study also demonstrated that low-status women
endeavored to do more to make up for their effort than did low-status men. These
findings suggest that following an embarrassing event, low-status individuals need to be
more concerned with appeasing a high-status other, than do high-status others with
appeasing someone o f lower status.
Keltner (1995) investigated the hypothesis, derived from an appeasement account
of embarrassment, that because embarrassment displays signal submissiveness, such
displays should be more readily recognizable when they come from a low-status other. In
this study, those low in status were operationally defined as individuals who came from
minority groups that have been historically viewed as having low status. The low-status
targets included women and African-Americans. Undergraduate participants were shown

9
a video of different undergraduate targets making prototypical displays of emotions
including amusement, embarrassment, and disgust, and the participants were asked to
identify the emotion being demonstrated. In one series o f studies, male and female
participants viewed emotional displays by male and female targets. In support of the
hypothesis, observers attributed more embarrassment to female targets than to male.
During a follow-up study, male and female undergraduate participants identified the
emotions displayed by African-American and Caucasian adolescent male targets. The
embarrassment displays of African-American targets were judged more accurately than
were Caucasian targets, and more embarrassment was attributed to the African-American
targets than to the Caucasian targets. It appears that the embarrassment displays of lowstatus individuals, which are meant to appease others, are more readily recognizable than
the embarrassment displays o f high-status individuals.
Embarrassment is an inherently negative emotional state from which sufferers
crave relief. As demonstrated by the previous study, the prototypical embarrassment
display is readily recognizable to observers; and yet individuals who experience
embarrassment often take additional steps to relieve their discomfort and repair their
social image, such as making jokes, or offering apologies (Keltner & Buswell, 1997).
Taking such remedial actions helps to demonstrate that embarrassed individuals
understand that they have committed a social blunder and seek forgiveness from those
who witnessed the norm violation (Goffman, 1967).
One o f the more commonly used strategies following an embarrassing
predicament is to use humor either by laughing or by making a joke or sarcastic
comment. Fink and Walker (1977) studied the use of this strategy during embarrassing
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situations involving either equal- or unequal- status pairs. Undergraduate participants in
the study had an embarrassing telephone conversation with a researcher who identified
herself as being a high school student (low status), an undergraduate (equal status), or a
professor (high status). Participants were found to laugh more when interacting with
equal-status others than when talking to low- or high-status others. The amount of verbal
humor in the form of joking or bantering used by the participants was not related to
status. However, it is questionable whether this status manipulation is a relevant one for
undergraduate students. Undergraduates certainly do compare themselves to their fellow
students in evaluating their social status, but it seems unlikely that undergraduates
compare themselves to either high school students or college professors in assessing their
place in the status hierarchy. Toward this end, it makes sense that participants would use
an appeasement strategy such as laughter when conversing with a peer, but not employ a
similar strategy when interacting with a professor or high school student. In the context
of casual phone conversation, undergraduates may simply be more concerned about the
impressions a fellow student is forming of them.
Another study that investigated the relationship between embarrassment, status,
and humor was conducted by Sueda and Wiseman (1992). They investigated the types of
remediation that Japanese and North American participants said they would use in
various scenarios that described events taking place in an organizational setting and
involved a superior, a peer, or a subordinate member of the hypothetical organization.
Participants read a series of scenarios about embarrassing events that resulted from
accidents, misidentification, tripping, misunderstandings, failing to live up to others’
expectations, physiological embarrassment, empathy for others who were embarrassed,
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and rudeness, and were asked to rate how likely they were to use remedial strategies
including apologizing, justification, making excuses, remediation, humor, aggression,
avoidance, stating that something has been done wrong, or doing nothing. Japanese
participants stated that they would tend not to use humor in situations involving others of
unequal status. As in the Fink and Walker study, it was found that humor was identified
as the strategy that would be used most among equals, and was said to be used more by
North Americans than by Japanese participants. In situations involving others of unequal
status, North American respondents adopted the strategy of simply stating that something
had been done wrong. The researchers also noted that the Japanese participants were
especially sensitive to status differentials among coworkers, perhaps relating to their
culture’s concern with the social self and the increased emphasis placed on public
presentation. Perhaps most relevant to understanding embarrassment remediation as a
way of negotiating a status hierarchy was the finding of significant differences between
the status groups in the use of an aggressive strategy, with individuals more likely to say
they would aggress against unequal- than equal-status others. It was also found that
individuals stated they were more likely to adopt an avoidant strategy when interacting
with unequal-status others. This study, like the Fink and Walker study, raises questions
about how individuals assess their social standing. It is possible that in a corporate
setting, individuals monitor their social status only in relation to others on the same rung
of the corporate ladder. It may be that the relation to superiors and subordinates is not as
significant as the comparison to relative equals.
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The Motivation to Express Embarrassment
Leary, Landel, and Patton (1996) investigated the appeasement theory of
embarrassment, offering experimental evidence that individuals who experience
embarrassment are motivated to engage in remedial behaviors to (a) relieve their own
discomfort, and (b) improve their social image. Participants in their first study were asked
to sing the overly sentimental song, Feelings (Albert, 1975) in front of a researcher,
which served as a threat to the social image. Some participants were then given the
opportunity to record their emotional state on paper, whereas others were not. Of those
participants who wrote down their emotions, half then had their answers examined by the
researcher. Participants whose responses were made public to the researcher subsequently
reported being less embarrassed on a follow-up questionnaire than participants who were
given no outlet for expressing their feelings, offering support for the idea that the public
expression of embarrassment decreases discomfort. In the second study, participants were
recorded while singing Feelings. During the experimental manipulation, participants’
level of facial blushing was ostensibly monitored by a thermistor that had actually been
set to give a reading indicating that the participants were blushing. For each participant in
the blushing condition, the researcher replayed a portion o f participant’s singing and then
commented that the participant’s face appeared to be flushed. The researcher went on to
say that hearing the tape must have caused the participant to blush. For each participant in
the nonblushing condition, the researcher replayed the tape and remarked that the
increase in flushing was due to the normal effects of exertion of the facial muscles during
the singing task. Participants whose blushing was attributed to arousal rather than to
embarrassment subsequently gave themselves more positive self-evaluations than did
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those whose embarrassment went unrecognized by the researcher. This suggests that
when an embarrassment display such as blushing does not serve to convey a positive
image of the self, embarrassed individuals will turn to other means of conveying a
positive image of the self, in hopes of repairing the social image. Individuals appear to be
motivated to convey their embarrassment to others, such that if one remedial strategy
fails, they turn to another to make their feelings known to others.
Displays of embarrassment do appear to serve a remedial function, but it would
seem that individuals sometimes have much to lose by publicly acknowledging a
shortcoming. For example, when teased about private thoughts, people who appear
embarrassed may actually lend credence to others’ unfounded accusations (Leary et al.,
1996). This is a situational factor, but there may also be stable personality factors that
contribute to the motivation to communicate embarrassment to others. The present study
will reexamine the results of Leary and colleagues by measuring the moderating effects
of various domains of self-esteem. Much of the previously cited research suggests that
dominance, status, or some other related dimension is important in understanding
reactions to embarrassing situations, but it remains unclear which domain is most
relevant.
Status as a Domain o f Self-esteem
Although researchers have investigated the relationship between embarrassment
and status, they have failed to adopt a universal definition of social status and to outline
how it differs from the construct of dominance. One potentially informative attempt to
separate these constructs was made by anthropologists Henrich and Gil-White (2001).
They suggested that dominance is a construct distinct from prestige, and that both
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dominance and prestige are paths by which an individual can achieve status. Henrich and
Gil-White defined dominance as the use of force or the threat of force to gain resources,
whereas they defined prestige as deference that is freely given by others. Among those
striving for dominance, the primary strategies for maintaining social rank involve
aggressing or threatening to aggress, evoking fear on the part o f subordinates, and
engaging in grandstanding. In stark contrast, those utilizing a prestigious strategy rely on
their unique talents and abilities to ensure their social position. “Prestige [in contrast to
dominance] rests on merit in the eyes of others (rather than force deployed against them),
and promotes admiration of inferiors (not their fear), a desire for proximity (not distance),
and periods of sustained observation (not furtive glances)” (p. 170). According to
Henrich and Gil-White, status is determined by the rewards that are reaped via either
dominant or prestigious strategies. They see the concepts o f status, dominance, and
prestige as being routinely conflated in the social sciences, as the rewards (status) and the
paths by which the rewards are obtained (dominance or prestige) are lumped together by
a variety of imprecisely defined terms such as power, leadership, influence, and wealth.
This distinction among status, dominance, and prestige raises important questions about
the value and generalizability of previous findings concerning the relationship among
embarrassment, status, and dominance.
Up to this point, our focus has been on how individual differences in dominance
and status are related to the subjective experience of and reaction to embarrassing
situations. However, one o f the earliest empirical studies o f embarrassment (Modigliani,
1968) investigated the predictive value of other personality constructs, such as self
esteem (SE) that might be related to the tendency to feel this emotion. As part of that
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study, a large (N= 183) sample of male undergraduates completed measures of
embarrassability, empathy, SE, test anxiety, and inadequacy. Based on the belief that
embarrassment “is generally precipitated by an awareness that one has failed to
demonstrate the demeanor considered appropriate to a particular social interaction, and
hence that one is being perceived by other present as deficient - as lacking certain
collectively valued attributes” (p. 313), the author hypothesized that individuals high in
traits such as empathy and test anxiety and low in general SE would be more likely to
become embarrassed in the 26 scenarios recounted on the embarrassability scale. Scores
on the scales were calculated such that high positive correlations indicated support for the
author’s hypothesis. In support of the hypothesis, it was found that feelings of inadequacy
were highly correlated with embarrassability (r = .50, p < .01), whereas general SE (r —
.25, p < .01) and test anxiety (r = .33,/? < .01) were more moderately correlated. These
results suggest that it is necessary to assess the predictive value of traits other than
dominance and status, such as SE, that may affect the experience of embarrassment.
According to Modigliani, embarrassment is caused by the belief that others’ perceptions
have been negatively affected by a social transgression. Modigliani’s finding that
embarrassability correlates with general SE suggests that a person’s reaction to others’
negative impressions is tied to the individual’s own self-perception.
Self-esteem is a construct that has received much attention in the social
psychological literature, but it was not until the emergence o f sociometer theory that
evolutionary theorists found a way to explain the function of feeling good (or bad) about
the self. Sociometer theory posits that one of the most important strategies for survival
among early hominids was social inclusion, or being accepted by others (Leary &
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Downs, 1995). As part of a social network, humans were afforded both protection from
environmental threats and opportunities for reproduction, and as a result, they benefited
from the ability to recognize when they were not receiving such social support. The
adaptation of SE provides such a monitoring device, as it functions as a sociometer, or
fuel-gauge, constantly checking individuals’ levels of inclusion and alerting them via
negative affect when their social networks fail to provide for their needs. Once the alarm
has sounded, individuals are motivated to go out and find a way to return their level of
inclusion to an optimal level, thus relieving the negative affect. Sociometer theory
represents an important departure from the predominant view of high SE as a goal or
motive. Instead, according to Leary and Downs (1995), SE is a functional gauge in which
low SE, which is indicative of a problem in the social network, can be as valuable as high
SE.
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (2001) proposed that whereas Leary’s sociometer theory
does provide a plausible adaptive explanation for SE, it fails to consider the breadth of
problems facing individuals in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA).
According to their theory, a gauge that simply monitors general trends in positive or
negative affect does not allow the individual to specifically pinpoint the source of the
problem. Instead, Kirkpatrick and Ellis posit that individuals benefit from the ability to
monitor their functioning in a number of different domains involving different types of
interpersonal relationships and varied, yet domain-specific adaptive problems. Multiple
sociometers evaluate performance in domains such as mating, within-group competition,
between-group competition, and kin relationships. Rather than simply identifying
problems in the various domains, the multiple sociometers have a variety o f functions

17

such as guiding individuals to maximize the quality of the relationships in which they
invest their resources. Kirkpatrick and Ellis proposed that one important gauge under the
umbrella of within-group competition is a dominance sociometer that lets individuals
know precisely where they fall in the hierarchy so they can appropriately choose to fight
with or flee from a competitor. Kirkpatrick and colleagues found empirical support for
their model when they showed that scores on self-perceived superiority (a measure of
social dominance among college students) were predictive of aggressive tendencies
against a same-sex competitor (Kirkpatrick, Waugh, Valencia, & Webster, 2002).
In a recent study, I reexamined Halberstadt and Green’s (1993) finding that
dominance is inversely related to blushing propensity and embarrassability in terms of
Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (2001) domain-specific self-esteem model and Henrich and GilWhite’s distinction between status, prestige, and dominance (Buttermore, 2003).
Participants were presented with a number of scenarios involving either friends or
strangers and were asked to rate how likely they would be to feel embarrassment, shame,
or guilt if they found themselves in that situation. Participants also filled out
questionnaires assessing a variety of domains of SE. Status, regardless of the strategy
used to obtain it (dominance or prestige) was an inverse predictor of the tendency to
experience embarrassment. When the scenarios involved friends and acquaintances, the
cooperative domains of social inclusion and prestige emerged as predictors of
embarrassment, whereas the competitive domain of mate value emerged as a predictor
when the scenarios involved strangers. Dominance also emerged as a significant predictor
of embarrassment among friends, with more dominant behavior associated with more
embarrassment. These findings demonstrate the importance o f assessing SE from a
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domain-specific perspective, as well as the value of distinguishing among the domains of
status, dominance, and prestige.
Reexamining the Function o f Embarrassment and the Relevant Domains o f SE
Researchers have approached the relationships between personality and
embarrassment from a variety of different perspectives. Based on the appeasement theory
of embarrassment, researchers have investigated status and dominance as predictors of
the remediation strategy employed by individuals. Others have focused on SE as a
predictor of embarrassability. The present studies sought to reconcile past findings about
status, dominance, and SE using Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (2001) theory, which identified
dominance as only one domain of SE. In addition, relying on Henrich and Gil-White’s
distinction, status, dominance, and prestige were treated as three distinct domains of SE
within the Kirkpatrick and Ellis domain-specific SE model. As part of the present studies,
individuals’ levels of self-perceived domain-specific SE were measured, and those values
were used to predict reactions to an embarrassing event.
The three studies reported here were designed to answer three research questions.
First, are individuals motivated to express their embarrassment to others following a selfpresentational predicament? This is the same research question addressed by Leary et al
(1996), and the current studies reexamined this question by attempting to replicate the
methodology and findings of Leary and colleagues. Recall that in support of the
appeasement hypothesis o f embarrassment, they found that individuals who had the
opportunity to communicate their embarrassment to someone else subsequently reported
being less embarrassed than those who did not have an opportunity to share their feelings.
I expected to replicate this finding in the present studies.
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The second research question relied on Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (2001) theory of
domain-specific SE. Are any or all of the domains of SE predictive of the tendency to
experience embarrassment? In a correlational study, Buttermore (2003) found that status,
not dominance or prestige, was inversely related to the tendency to experience
embarrassment in a variety of scenarios. However, Halberstadt and Green (1993) found
that it was dominance that was inversely related to both embarrassability and blushing
propensity. The present studies sought to clarify these findings from questionnaire studies
in a controlled laboratory setting. Using the distinction between dominance, status, and
prestige, as outlined by Henrich and Gil-White (2001), I expected to find further support
for the Buttermore (2003) finding that status is the crucial predictor o f the tendency to
experience embarrassment.
With the third research question I sought to integrate an understanding of the
motivation to express embarrassment with an understanding of individual differences
from the perspective of domain-specific SE. More specifically, how do the various
domains of self-esteem moderate individuals’ motivation to convey their embarrassment
to others following an embarrassing event? Gonzales and colleagues (1990) manipulated
social status in the laboratory and demonstrated that high- and low-status individuals
reacted differently to an embarrassing situation. If individuals are sensitive to the
manipulation o f status in the lab, it seems likely that those who see themselves as having
high status in their daily interactions will react differently to embarrassing events than
will those who see themselves as low status. Rather than manipulating status, the current
studies were designed to assess self-reported levels of status, dominance, and prestige,
and to investigate whether individual differences in these domains were predictive of the
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motivation to communicate embarrassment as in the Leary et al. (1996) study. It was
expected that status would have a moderating effect on the Leary et al. findings.
Study 1 was a replication of Leary et al. (1996), with the addition of measures of
four domains of SE as well as a measure of global SE. The study was designed to test the
degree to which the domains of status, dominance, and prestige are related to the
tendency to experience less embarrassment after being given the opportunity to share
one’s feelings with someone else. Due to problems with the reliability of some measures
of domain-specific SE in Study 1, in the second study I attempted to improve the
measures of status, dominance, and prestige. Finally, in Study 3 , 1 sought to replicate the
results from Study 1, using the improved measures of domain-specific SE.

STUDY 1

This study was designed to replicate Leary and colleagues’ (1996) study, while
accounting for the predictive power of various domain-specific self-esteems. As in the
Leary et al. study, participants completed a singing task in front of a researcher. Some
participants were then given the opportunity to convey their embarrassment to the
researcher, whereas others were not. In addition, participants completed measures of four
distinct domains of SE, as well as a measure global SE. Due to time constraints,
participants were not assessed on all the domains of SE as proposed by Kirkpatrick and
Ellis (2001). Instead, participants completed measures of the domains believed to be most
related to the tendency to express one’s emotions in the laboratory setting. These domains
included status, dominance, prestige, and mate value.
There were three sets of predictions made about the study. The first hypothesis
relates to the attempt to replicate Leary et al. (1996). I expected to find support for their
conclusion that participants whose embarrassment is unknown to the researcher should
rate themselves as more embarrassed than participants who have had a prior opportunity
to demonstrate their feelings to the researcher. The second set o f hypotheses concerns the
predictive power of domain-specific SE. Based on previous findings (Buttermore, 2003)
it was hypothesized that (a) domain-specific SEs would be predictive of the tendency to
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express embarrassment, (b) the domain of status would be the best predictor of
embarrassment, and (c) global SE would not predict emotional expression above and
beyond the predictive power of the specific domains of SE. The final hypothesis concerns
the moderation of Leary and colleagues’ findings by domain-specific SE. It was expected
that high-status individuals would be less embarrassed than lower status individuals after
having the opportunity to share their embarrassment with the researcher. This final
hypothesis is largely based on the findings from the Gonzales et al. (1990) study, that
when the consequences o f an embarrassing event were severe, high- and low-status
participants did not differ in amount remedial effort they extended, whereas when the
consequences of an embarrassing predicament were less, low-status participants extended
more effort to compensate for their actions. This finding seems to suggest that when an
embarrassing incident is relatively minor, as is presumably the case in Leary and
colleagues’ (1996) laboratory singing task, low-status individuals feel worse than higher
status offenders. Therefore, when given the opportunity to express their embarrassment in
the present study, high-status participants should express less embarrassment after having
a chance to convey their feelings than should low-status participants. For low-status
participants, simply having their feelings made public should not go very far toward
relieving discomfort. As in the Gonzales et al. study, low-status participants should
require more extensive action to relieve their embarrassment.
Method
Participants
One hundred undergraduate students (50 males and 50 females) from the College
of William and Mary participated in the study in partial fulfillment of an introductory
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psychology course requirement. Two students withdrew from the study after being told
they would be asked to complete a singing task. Three additional participants were
eliminated from the sample because of equipment malfunction or experimenter error
during the experimental session, leaving a total sample size o f N = 95 (48 males and 47
females). The experimental sessions were conducted by two male and two female
experimenters.
Procedure and Materials
There were three portions of the study: personality measures, singing task, and
follow-up questionnaire. The order in which participants completed the first two parts
was randomized. The singing task and the follow-up questionnaire were taken directly
from the procedure as outlined by Leary et al. (1996). See Appendix A for a copy of the
Verbatim Script. All participants signed a consent form before beginning the study (See
Appendix B).
Personality measures. Participants completed a battery of questionnaires designed
to measure various conceptualizations of SE. Responses on all SE assessments were
given on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Rosenberg’s
(1965) 10-item SE scale was included as a standard measure o f global SE (See Appendix
C). Two additional questionnaires were included in order to measure distinct domains of
SE as outlined by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (2001).
The Self-Perceived Mating Success Scale (Landolt, Lalumiere, & Quinsey, 1995)
measures mate value, or the degree to which members o f the opposite sex see the
respondent as an attractive potential romantic partner (See Appendix D). Sample items
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include, “Members o f the opposite sex that I like, tend to like me back” and “I do not
receive many compliments from members of the opposite sex” (reverse scored).
The Self-Perceived Social Status Scale (SSSS; Buttermore, James, & Kirkpatrick,
2003) is a 21-item measure adapted from the California Psychological Inventory's
Dominance Subscale (Megargee, 1972) and Leary, Cottrell, and Phillips’ (2001) Social
Dominance Scale, with additional items generated by the researchers. The measure yields
scores in the three domains of dominance, prestige, and status, as distinguished by
Henrich and Gil-White (2001; See Appendix E). The 7-item dominance subscale includes
items such as, “I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way” and “I demand
respect from members o f my peer group.” Cronbach’s alpha for the dominance subscale
has previously been found to be .78 (Buttermore, 2003); alpha in the present study was
.75. Prestige items include, “There are some matters on which I am considered an expert
by others” and “Members of my peer group respect and admire me.” Alpha for the
prestige scale has previously been reported as .78; in the present study, alpha for the 6item subscale was found to be .62. The status subscale includes items such as, “I must
admit that I try to see what others think before I take a stand” (reverse scored) and “I
sometimes do favors for people to get on their good side” (reverse scored). Previous
alpha levels for the status subscale have been reported as .55. In the present study, alpha
for the 5-item subscale was .62.
Singing task. Participants were told that they were going to listen to and follow
the instructions given to them on an instructional audiotape and that their responses
would be recorded. In an effort to prevent the participants from making spontaneous
expressions of their feelings, the researcher asked the participants to refrain from
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speaking unless the researcher spoke to them first. The researcher then started the
instructional audiotape and the recording device. The researcher remained in the room
while each participant completed the task, but was seated out of the participants’ line of
sight and refrained from looking at the participants.
The taped instructions informed the participants that they would be introduced to
the Morris Albert song “Feelings.” Participants first followed along on a lyrics sheet,
while the first four stanzas of the song were played. Next, participants were instructed to
sing along as the recording was played again. This time, participants were told to sing
into a microphone and to imagine that they were “performing the song on stage in front
of an audience.”
Following the singing task, participants were randomly assigned to one of the
three conditions designed by Leary et al. (1996): public-expression, private-expression,
and no-expression. Participants in the public- and private-expression conditions
completed a questionnaire that asked them to rate how they felt during the singing task on
five adjectives on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Three adjectives related to
embarrassment (e.g. silly, embarrassed, foolish), whereas two adjectives were unrelated
to embarrassment (e.g. bored, happy). The researcher left the room while the participant
completed this initial questionnaire (See Appendix F). In the public-expression condition,
the researcher then returned to the room and examined the participants’ responses, to
ensure that the participants realized the researcher knew how they were feeling. Before
leaving the room, the researcher instructed participants in the private-expression
condition to place their response sheets in a large manila folder filled with other response
sheets. This was done to make sure the researcher remained unaware of the participants’
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feelings. Participants in the no-expression condition were not asked to complete the
initial questionnaire; therefore, as in the private-expression condition, the researcher
remained unaware of the participants’ emotional state during the singing task. The
private-expression condition was included in an attempt to control for the possibility that
privately recording embarrassed feelings could serve to reduce embarrassment.
Follow-up questionnaire. As in the Leary et al. (1996) study, all participants
completed a final questionnaire that asked them to rate on a 12-point scale from not at all
to extremely how they felt at that moment. Five of the adjectives were related to
embarrassment (e.g. nervous, self-conscious, foolish, embarrassed, calm), whereas two
adjectives served as unrelated filler items (e.g. hostile, depressed). Participants were
instructed prior to completing the final questionnaire, both verbally and in writing, that
their responses would be examined by the experimenter (See Appendix G).
Finally, in order to establish the effectiveness of the expression manipulation,
participants were asked two follow-up questions. The first asked whether they had
completed a questionnaire which asked them about their feelings during the singing task.
The second question, which was asked only of those who answered in the affirmative to
the first question, asked whether the researcher had examined the participant’s responses
to the questionnaire about the singing task.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks & Preliminary Analyses
Four participants gave incorrect answers on the manipulation check items. Of
these participants, three were in the public-expression condition. One participant
incorrectly answered that he had not completed a questionnaire asking about his feelings

during the singing task. The other two participants failed to indicate that the researcher
had looked at their answers to the initial questionnaire. The fourth participant to give an
incorrect answer was in the private-expression condition and incorrectly answered that he
had not completed the questionnaire about his feelings during the singing task. These
errors can probably be attributed to the confusing nature of the manipulation check
questions, rather than to problems in the methodology. When given the manipulation
check items, participants often looked confused. Several even explained to the
researchers that they thought such seemingly straightforward questions were actually
meant to trick them. Nonetheless, the responses of these four participants were removed
from the sample, leaving a sample size of N = 91 (46 men and 45 women).
Each of the three factors of the status scale was treated as a measure of a separate
domain of SE. The correlations among the SE scales are shown in Table 1. Of the
measures of domain-specific SE, only dominance was not significantly positively
correlated with global SE. The correlations were similar among males and females, with
two exceptions. Status and dominance were significantly positively correlated for males
(r = .41,/? < .01), and although the correlation was in the same direction among females
(r = .26), it was not significant. Status and prestige were significantly positively
correlated for females (r = .40,/? < .01), but the correlation was not significant among
males (r = .12).
Replication o f Leary et al. (1996)
The first goal of the present study was to retest the conclusions drawn by Leary et
al. (1996). To do this, a principal components factor analysis of the seven items of the
follow-up questionnaire was conducted to ensure that the five embarrassment items
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formed one factor. As in the Leary et al. study, I completed an oblimin rotation. Two
factors emerged with eigenvalues of 4.00 and 1.23. All five embarrassment items showed
high loadings (> .73) on the first factor. The two non-embarrassment items (e.g.
depressed, hostile) showed high loadings on the second factor (> .80). Based on these
analyses, the five embarrassment items were summed to yield a measure of self-reported
embarrassment. Cronbach’s alpha for the five items on the follow-up questionnaire meant
to assess self-reported embarrassment was .92.
A 2 (sex) x 3 (condition) analysis of variance was conducted on the self-reported
embarrassment scores. There was no main effect of sex (F < 1) and the interaction of sex
and condition was not significant (F < 1), indicating that males and females did not differ
significantly in their reported embarrassment. Table 2 compares the means of selfreported embarrassment by condition, for both the Leary et al. (1996) study and the
present study. The main finding from the Leary et al. study was that individuals in the no
expression condition whose feelings were unknown to the researcher reported being
significantly more embarrassed than those in the public-expression condition whose
embarrassment was known by the researcher. In order to retest this finding, a planned
contrast was used, in which participants in the public-expression condition were
compared to participants in the no-expression condition (contrast coefficients = -1, 0, +1).
Consistent with the findings of Leary and colleagues, participants who did not have the
opportunity to convey their embarrassment to the researcher reported being more
embarrassed than participants whose feelings were known to the researcher, F(l,88) =
11.35, p < . 001.
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Leary and colleagues (1996) also found that self-reported embarrassment in the
private-expression condition was not significantly different from either the public or no
expression conditions. In the present study, a planned contrast (contrast coefficients = 0,
-1, +1) demonstrated that the private-expression condition was significantly different
from the no-expression condition, F(l,88) = 15.07,

< .001. An additional contrast

(contrast coefficients = -1, +1, 0) found that the private-expression condition did not
differ from the public-expression condition, F(l,88) = 0.26 ,p > .05. These two contrasts
offer partial support for the Leary et al. findings, but Table 2 reveals very different
patterns of results in the Leary et al. study and this replication. The mean for the privateexpression condition in Leary and colleagues’ study fell between the public and no
expression means, whereas the mean for the private-expression condition in the present
study was actually slightly less than the mean for the public-expression condition.
The present study does replicate Leary and colleagues’ (1996) main finding
concerning the differences between the public- and no-expression conditions, according
to the statistical tests they chose to run. However, the most direct test of the hypothesis
that individuals are motivated to share their embarrassment with others as a way to repair
a damaged social image is to use planned contrasts to compare the levels of
embarrassment reported by those in the public-expression condition to those in the
private and no-expression conditions. According to an interpersonal model of
embarrassment, I would expect the scores in the private-expression condition to look
much like the scores in the no-expression condition, as those in the private-expression
condition recorded their feelings immediately after the singing task, but those feelings
remained unknown to the researcher. To test this hypothesis, the self-reported
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embarrassment of participants who had the opportunity to share their feelings with the
researcher (public-expression) was compared to participants in the other two conditions
whose feelings remained unknown to the researcher (contrast coefficients = -2, +1, +1).
The results were not significant, F(l,88) = 2.69, p =.11. Indeed, as Table 2 shows, selfreported embarrassment for those in the private-expression condition was on average
actually slightly lower than embarrassment reported by those in the public-expression
condition.
There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, as suggested by Leary
et al. (1996), it could be that simply acknowledging embarrassment in private does help
to partially relieve discomfort. Based on their finding that the average level of
embarrassment reported by participants in the private-expression condition fell midway
between the public and no-expression conditions, Leary and colleagues went on to argue
that whereas recognizing embarrassment in private went part-way to relieving those
feelings, publicly conveying embarrassment helped to further reduce discomfort. The
data from the present study suggest that a private acknowledgement o f foolishness may
be just as effective as a public declaration at decreasing embarrassment.
It is also possible that a problem with the private-expression condition
manipulation may account for the disparities between the results o f the private-expression
manipulation in the present study and in the Leary et al. (1996) study. During the present
study, participants were asked to place their responses to the initial embarrassment
questionnaire into a large manila folder that contained other folded copies of the
questionnaire, whereas in the Leary et al. study participants were asked to stuff their
completed questionnaires into a sealed box filled with other questionnaires. Participants
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in the present study may have believed that the experimenters would be able to match
their responses on the initial questionnaire with their responses on the other scales, as the
envelope was not sealed. If participants did believe that their answers to the initial
questionnaire would eventually be viewed by the experimenter, the private-expression
condition then functions like the public-expression condition, in which participants
believed they had the opportunity to convey their embarrassment to the researcher. This
potential problem with the private-expression condition will be addressed in Study 3.
Domain-Specific Self-Esteems as Predictors o f Embarrassment
The second major goal of Study 1 was to test whether specific domains of self
esteem were more predictive of embarrassment than was global SE. In order to
accomplish this, the four domain-specific SE scales, global SE, condition, and sex (males
= +1 and females = -1) were entered into a regression equation predicting embarrassment
on the final questionnaire. Two orthogonal contrasts were entered into each regression
equation to account for the condition variable: Condition Contrast 1 (contrast coefficients
= +2, -1,-1) and Condition Contrast 2 (contrast coefficients = 0, +1, -1). The regression
coefficients for each variable are presented in Table 3. Only Condition Contrast 2
emerged as a significant predictor o f self-reported embarrassment (p = -.40, p < .001).
This analysis failed to offer support for the hypothesis that domain-specific SEs are
predictive of embarrassment, but it did offer support for the prediction that global SE
would not be a significant predictor above and beyond the predictive value of the various
domains of SE. Based on previous findings (Buttermore, 2003), it was hypothesized that
of the dominance, status, and prestige subscales of the SSSS, the domain of status would
be related to self-reported embarrassment. None of the three domains emerged as a
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significant predictor of embarrassment, and it was dominance rather than status that came
the closest to significantly predicting embarrassment (|3 = -.16,/? = .15).
Domain-specific Self-esteems as Moderators o f the Leary et al. (1996) Findings
In order to assess the degree to which the various domains o f self-esteem were
predictive of the tendency to experience less embarrassment after expressing the
emotions, a series o f multiple regression analyses was conducted. Each of the domainspecific SE scales was mean-centered and entered individually into a regression equation
containing the scale scores from the other domain-specific SE measures, as well as
effects-coded variables representing condition, sex, the interaction of sex and the domain
of SE, and the interaction of condition and the domain of SE. Two orthogonal contrasts
were entered into each regression equation to account for the condition variable:
Condition Contrast 1 (contrast coefficients = +2, -1,-1) and Condition Contrast 2
(contrast coefficients = 0, +1, -1). Of the two contrasts for condition included in each
multiple regression, Condition Contrast 1 is of primary interest because it compares the
public-expression condition to both of the other two conditions in which the participants
did not have the opportunity to share their emotions with the researcher. Moreover, a test
of the interaction between Condition Contrast 1 and each of the mean-centered domains
of SE assesses the degree to which individuals’ SE in that domain is related to the amount
of embarrassment they reported after having the opportunity to convey their
embarrassment to others.
For the multiple regression equations examining the moderating effects of status,
prestige, mate value, and global SE, the only significant predictor to emerge was
Condition Contrast 2. As previously revealed by the planned contrasts, the significance of

Condition Contrast 2 as a predictor in the multiple regression equations indicated that the
private-expression condition differed significantly from the no-expression condition.
These results fail to offer support for the prediction that the interaction of status and
condition would be a significant predictor of embarrassment, with high-status individuals
reporting more embarrassment in the private- and no-expression conditions and less
embarrassment after having a chance to share their emotions in the public-expression
condition. Only the regression equation testing the predictive value o f dominance showed
a significant interaction between Condition Contrast 1 and a domain of SE (Table 4).
Table 5 presents the regression coefficients for all of the variables in this latter
multiple regression equation that included the interaction terms for dominance. Three
significant predictors emerged in the dominance multiple regression: dominance,
Condition Contrast 2, and the dominance x Condition Contrast 1 interaction. Dominance
was a significant inverse predictor of embarrassment (p = -.23, p < .05), demonstrating
that more dominant individuals reported less embarrassment than less dominant
individuals. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant Dominance x
Condition Contrast 1 interaction (p = -.56, p < .01), such that in the public-expression
condition there was a negative relationship between dominance and embarrassment,
whereas there was no such relationship in the private- and no-expression conditions.
Figure 1 presents these findings for an individual at +1 SD on dominance (high) and an
individual at -1 SD on dominance (low).
Of all the types of SE assessed, only dominance emerged as a significant predictor
of the tendency to share one’s emotional discomfort with others. Individuals high in
dominance were found to mirror the main finding o f the Leary et al. (1996) study, that
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individuals in the public-expression condition, who had the chance to share their
emotions with the researcher, reported being much less embarrassed than those in both
the private and no-expression conditions, whose feelings about the singing task remained
private. However, the self-reported embarrassment of the less dominant individuals
differed little between the public and private/no-expression conditions. In addition, the
mean self-reported embarrassment scores of less dominant individuals in both conditions
look similar to the embarrassment scores reported by the more dominant individuals in
the private/no-expression conditions (See Figure 1).
This study failed to support the hypothesis that high-status individuals would
express less embarrassment than would lower-status individuals after having the
opportunity to share their feelings with someone else. Instead, this effect emerged among
highly dominant individuals. It is only those individuals who use a dominant strategy to
achieve their status who were greatly relieved when given the opportunity to
communicate their levels of embarrassment. In a theoretical paper about status, Gilbert
(1990) reviewed the literature on reconciliation between those high and low in status.
Gilbert noted that among many nonhuman species the winners o f status competitions
engage in behaviors that help to encourage the losers to engage in affiliative behaviors
toward the winners. For example, the winner might groom the loser or allow the loser to
remain in close proximity. Such actions are meant to inspire loyalty on the part of the
lower-status other. Gilbert does not distinguish between dominant and prestigious
strategies for achieving status in his paper; however, it might make sense to apply this
distinction to his ideas.

According to Henrich and Gil-White (2001), a prestigious person has status freely
conferred upon him or herself because he or she has something unique to contribute to
the social group. Prestigious people should therefore have little concern in an
embarrassing situation about taking remedial actions in order to apologize for a social
infraction. Their social inclusion is secure because they have something to offer the group
that no one else can. Dominant people, on the other hand, rely on brute force to maintain
their positions in the hierarchy. If a dominant individual is caught doing something
embarrassing, he or she must be more concerned about offending others and the potential
for loss of regard than is a prestigious person. It is possible that during Study 1, more
dominant individuals expressed more embarrassment than less dominant individuals in
the no-expression condition because of this increased fear about the possibility of
interpersonal rejection. However, for the minor social crime of singing an embarrassing
song, the dominant individuals felt significant relief when given the opportunity to share
their embarrassment with others in the public-expression condition. Perhaps on the part
of highly dominant individuals, having their embarrassment observed by someone else, in
their minds, served the same function as Gilbert’s reconciliation behaviors, making the
observer o f the embarrassment realize that the dominant individual had recognized his or
her shortcomings and was willing to display conciliatory behaviors. Alternatively, it
could be that for those dominant people in the public-expression condition, the
opportunity to fill out a second questionnaire about their levels of embarrassment was
taken as a chance to downplay the importance of the answers on the first questionnaire. If
participants did not expect to have their responses on the first questionnaire examined,
dominant individuals, who are more concerned about what others think of them, may
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have used the second questionnaire to try to convince the observer that their performance
on the singing task was not as negatively impactful as their previous responses might
indicate. The low embarrassment reported by the dominant individuals could be an
attempt at damage control and impression management. Meanwhile, for those lower in
dominance, who were less concerned about being social rejected, the opportunity to
convey their embarrassment, had little effect toward relieving their discomfort.
According to Leary and Miller (1992), embarrassment can be such a negative
experience for the individual experiencing it that the individual is motivated to behave
prosocially in an effort to relieve the discomfort. Perhaps the drop in embarrassment
reported by more dominant individuals after having the chance to express their feelings to
another person reflects the belief that simply making someone else aware o f their
discomfort is enough to appease the other. Perhaps the less dominant others believe it
takes additional reconciliatory behaviors in order to make sure the other person forgives
the faux pas. This corresponds to the finding from the Gonzales (1990) study (which did
not distinguish between dominance and prestige), in which low-status others did more to
attempt to make up for spilling a drink on someone else’s possessions than did higher
status others.

STUDY 2

One major concern with the results o f Study 1 is the low reliability of the SSSS
subscales (a = .62 to .75). This is a major concern due to the reduced power for testing
hypotheses involving these scales. The goal o f Study 2 was to improve the status,
dominance, and prestige subscales o f the SSSS before attempting to replicate the first
study. Toward this end, 19 new items were generated and added to the 21-item version of
the SSSS used in the previous study. The revised scale was administered to a large
sample of university undergraduates, and the responses were analyzed using exploratory
factor analysis.
Method
Three hundred and eighty-five undergraduate students (201 males and 184
females) at the College of William & Mary received course credit for their participation
in this study. The participants were pooled from three separate studies including an online
study of daily interactions, a study of testosterone and fluctuating asymmetry, and a
replication of Study 1 of the present paper. Participants in the daily interactions study
completed the materials electronically, whereas participants in the other two studies
completed pencil and paper versions. Care was taken such that there was no overlap with
students participating in more than one of the three studies.
The SSSS (Buttermore, James, & Kirkpatrick, 2003) was revised in an attempt to
increase the reliability and validity o f the status, dominance, and prestige subscales. The
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authors generated additional items, which were added to the 21-item scale used in Study
1. Please see Table 6 for a list of the 40-items of the revised scale.
Results and Discussion
I performed a principal-axes factor analysis on the 40 items from the SSSS. On
the basis of eigenvalues and inspection of the scree plot, I examined both the three and
four factor solutions, eventually settling on three primary factors of interest. Eigenvalues
of the four factors were 9.17, 3.81, 2.51, and 1.69; the next highest eigenvalue was 1.54.
Because status, dominance, and prestige have been shown to be significantly correlated in
Study 1 (See Table 1), I examined the structure matrix for the three-factor oblimin
rotation, which is shown in Table 6. The structure matrix for the four-factor oblimin
rotation is shown in Table 7. Items 2, 22, 33, and 35 were eliminated because they loaded
on more than one factor. Item 29 loaded on Factor 2 in the three factor solution, but did
not load strongly on any factor in the four factor solution, so it was eliminated. Items 8,
23, and 30 were eliminated because they loaded most strongly on Factor 4, which appears
to be assessing reactions to public recognition. Henrich & Gil-White (2001) did not
explain how reactions to praise should be differentially related to status, dominance, or
prestige. Therefore, Factor 4 was not considered as a theoretically distinct factor.
Fourteen items loaded on the prestige scale, but there appeared to be redundancy
in some of the items. Therefore, items 21, 24, 25, and 28 were eliminated in order to
avoid repeating statements similar to those that were part of the earlier version of the
prestige scale. Items 3, 7, 12, 14, 17, 20, 27, 37, 38, and 40 that loaded on Factor 1
describe a person who has deference freely conferred upon him or her. Being respected
and admired, having one’s opinion valued, being imitated, having high status, possessing
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expertise that is recognized by others, and offering unique talents and abilities are all
characteristics ascribed to a prestigious person (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Cronbach’s
alpha for the prestige scale was .89.
Items 6, 9, 16, 19, 32, 36, and 39 loaded most strongly on Factor 2. Items 13 and
26 loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 4, and were selected for this subscale after the decision
was made not to consider Factor 4 a theoretically distinct factor. Despite a split loading
on Factor 1 and Factor 2, Item 31 was selected for this subscale when it was determined
that adding it increased the reliability of the subscale. The 10 items that were selected for
Factor 2 describe a tendency to rely upon displays of dominance as a strategy for gaining
others’ compliance. Statements from this subscale involve using aggressive tactics to get
one’s way, giving orders, having control over others, refusing to compromise, and
fighting one’s way to the top. Factor 2 describes individuals who are willing to use force
to sway others’ opinions. This factor has been labeled “dominance.” Cronbach’s alpha for
the dominance scale was .81.
Items 1,5, 11, 15, 18, and 34 loaded most strongly on Factor 3. Item 10 loaded on
Factor 1 and Factor 3, but was selected for Factor 3 because it loaded with that subscale
in earlier studies (Buttermore, 2003). Item 4 was selected for Factor 4 despite a split
loading when it was determined that adding it increased the reliability of the subscale. At
first glance, Factor 3 appears to be the opposite of dominant behavior. The eight items
loading on this factor seem to describe the prototypical “wuss,” a person who is
submissive, compromising, and willing to let others walk all over him or her. The eight
items that loaded on this factor included statements about doing favors to get on
someone’s good side, deferring to others when decisions have to be made, trying to see
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what others think before taking a stand, letting others win arguments, and being easily
intimidated by dominant individuals. However, by rewording the five previously
mentioned items, we are reminded that a high status person is one who does not have to
do favors to get on someone’s good side, is not expected to defer to others in decision
making, takes a stand without first trying to see what others think, does not let others win
arguments, and is not easily intimidated by dominant individuals. Factor 3 has therefore
been tentatively labeled “status.” The status scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .75.
All eight of the items that loaded on the status scale are reverse-scored, suggesting
that these items might be better conceptualized as a submissiveness factor than as a status
factor. Some research into psychopathology has focused on the importance of treating
submissiveness as a construct that is distinct from dominance (Allan & Gilbert, 1997;
Gilbert & Allan, 1994). Correlational studies have revealed that high assertiveness
(dominance) and submissiveness are not equivalent constructs. Hallmarks of submissive
behavior such as fear of strangers and passivity are related to psychological disorders
such as social anxiety and depression that are not strongly related to measures of
dominance. These findings suggest that submissive and dominant behaviors are perhaps
best conceptualized as two distinct dimensions rather than one bipolar dimension. Future
research should attempt to clarify this relationship by validating the status subscale of the
SSSS against an existing measure of submissive behavior, such as the Submissive
Behavior Scale (Allan & Gilbert, 1997).
Study 2 was designed to increase the reliability of the three subscales of the SelfPerceived Social Status Scale. This goal was achieved for two of the three subscales. The
alphas of the 10-item prestige and dominance subscales were found to be above .80,
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indicating that they are reliable measures. Treating each o f the 3 factors from the status
scale as a measure of a separate construct, I examined the correlations among the SE
scales. As expected, the three subscales were significantly correlated with one another (ps
< .001). Henrich and Gil-White believed that dominance and prestige were two distinct
pathways to achieving status. Status was significantly correlated with both dominance (r
= .21) and prestige (r = .42). Lending credence to the importance of the distinction
between these two pathways is the relatively low correlation between dominance and
prestige (r = .23). However, the alpha for the 8-item status scale is a little low at .75. The
status subscale continues to be problematic. In terms of questionnaire design, it has been
difficult to write and validate items that assess status without making a distinction as to
the method used to obtain that status.
My failure to design a reliable status scale could also be due in part to the
population in which the measures were administered. The College of William & Mary is
a highly-selective public university, at which the students value academic success. In
such an academic setting, it seems safe to assume that the most common pathway taken
for achieving status is by prestigious means. Students seek to establish themselves
through their talents and abilities rather than through strength or force. This fact is
reinforced by the fact that the questionnaire item, “I have high status in my social groups”
loaded on the prestige factor rather than the status factor. Participants in the present study
appeared to think of the words status and prestige as synonyms. In fact, the highest
correlation among the SSSS subscales was found between status and prestige (r = .42, p <
.001). It is perhaps impractical to attempt to measure the construct of status
independently. I will continue to work to improve the status scale, but I believe it is
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necessary to focus on the most important distinction as assessed by the much-improved
prestige and dominance subscales.

STUDY 3

There were two major goals for Study 3. The first aim was to clarify the nature of
participants’ emotional expressions in the private-expression condition. Leary et al.
(1996) found that the levels of self-reported embarrassment reported in the privateexpression condition fell midway between those reported in the public and no-expression
conditions, but did not differ significantly from either of those two. Study 1 showed that
the amount o f embarrassment reported in the private condition was not significantly
different from the amount of embarrassment reported in the public-expression condition,
suggesting that recording one’s embarrassment on paper is just as effective at relieving
discomfort as is sharing embarrassment with someone else. In Study 3, special effort was
made to ensure that the participants’ responses in the private-expression condition
remained completely anonymous. With these extra measures taken to ensure the privacy
of participants’ responses, it was hypothesized that the results would support the
conclusions drawn by Leary and colleagues. It was expected that participants in the
public-expression condition would report significantly less embarrassment than those in
either the private- or no-expression conditions who had no opportunity to share their
emotions with someone else.
The second aim of the study was to reexamine the findings of Study 1, using the
improved measures of status, dominance, and prestige, as revised in Study 2. As in Study
1, hypotheses were made about the predictive powers of domain-specific SE, as well as
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the moderating effects of domain-specific SE on the effects described by Leary and
colleagues (1996). Study 1 found that no domain of SE emerged as a significant predictor
of embarrassment when entered into a regression equation with all the other domains,
global SE, condition, and sex of participant. It was hypothesized that in the present study
(a) if there was significant power for any domain to emerge as a significant predictor in
this equation, that domain would be dominance, and (b) global SE would not emerge as a
predictor o f embarrassment when domain-specific SEs were included in the regression
equation. In further support of the results from Study 1 concerning the interaction of
dominance and condition, it was hypothesized that (a) dominant individuals would
express lower levels of embarrassment than less dominant individuals after having the
opportunity to share their embarrassment with the researcher, and (b) conveying
embarrassment to others would have little impact on the embarrassment reported by less
dominant individuals.
Method
Participants
Ninety-nine undergraduate students (49 males and 50 females) from the College
of William and Mary participated in the study in partial fulfillment of an introductory
psychology course requirement. One student withdrew from the study after being told she
would be asked to complete a singing task. Six additional participants were eliminated
from the sample because of experimenter error during the experimental session or due to
failure on the part o f the participant to follow directions. The most common problem with
the experimental manipulation was participants who verbally expressed their
embarrassment to the researcher despite being given instructions not to speak unless
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asked to by the experimenter. After exclusions, the total sample size was N = 92 (46
males and 47 females). The experimental sessions were conducted by three male and two
female experimenters.
Procedure and Materials
Participants completed the same three portions o f the study as in Study 1:
personality measures, singing task, and follow-up questionnaire. The materials and
procedure used in Study 3 were virtually identical to those used in Study 1, with two
exceptions. First, the new, more reliable status, prestige, and dominance subscales of the
Self-Perceived Social Status Scale were administered to the participants. All 40 items
from the SSSS, as revised in Study 2 were included in the study materials (Table 5). The
three subscales were created with the items as selected by the factor analyses in Study 2.
The 10-item prestige scale had an alpha of .82, the 10-item dominance scale had an alpha
of .76, and the 8 -item status scale had an alpha of .75.
In order to address possible problems with the private-expression condition in
Study 1 ,1 attempted to create a situation in which participants would believe that their
answers to the initial questionnaire remained completely anonymous. Rather than placing
their completed questionnaires into an envelope, as in Study 1, participants in the privateexpression condition were instructed by the researcher before he or she left the room to
fold their answers to the initial questionnaire and to place those folded answers into a
sealed box so that their “answers remained anonymous.” Participants were then instructed
to crack to the door to let the researcher know that he or she could return to the room.

46

Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks & Preliminary Analyses
Two participants gave incorrect answers on the manipulation check items. Both of
these participants were in the private-expression condition and incorrectly answered that
they had not completed a questionnaire asking about their feelings during the singing
task. As stated in Study 1, these errors can probably be attributed to the confusing nature
of the manipulation check questions, rather than to problems in the methodology. The
responses of these two participants were removed from the sample, leaving a sample size
of N = 90 (45 men and 45 women).
Each of the three factors of the status scale was treated as a measure of a separate
domain of SE. The correlations among the SE scales are shown in Table 8 . Of the
measures of domain-specific SE, only dominance was not significantly positively
correlated with global SE. The correlations were similar among males and females, with
one exception. Among females, dominance was significantly positively correlated with
status (r = .40,/? < .01), prestige (r = .39,p < .01), and mate value (r = .39,/? < .01), but
among males, none of those correlation was significant (rs < .28).
Reexamining the Differences among the Public-, Private-, and No-Expression Conditions
As in Study 1, a principal components factor analysis of the seven items of the
follow-up questionnaire was conducted to ensure that the five embarrassment items
formed one factor. Based on eigenvalues of 3.69 and 1.02, two factors were retained.
Using an oblimin rotation, all five embarrassment items showed high loadings (> .67) on
the first factor. Of the two non-embarrassment items, depressed showed a high loading
on the second factor (.93). However, hostile loaded evenly on both factors (.44 on Factor

47

1 and .46 on Factor 2). Because this item failed to load uniquely on one factor, it was not
included in the analysis of the embarrassment items. The five embarrassment items were
summed to yield a measure of self-reported embarrassment. Alpha for the five items on
the follow-up questionnaire meant to assess self-reported embarrassment was .8 8 .
A 2 (sex) x

3

(condition) analysis of variance was conducted on the self-reported

embarrassment scores. There was no main effect of sex, F(l,89) = 3.53,/? > .05, and the
interaction of sex and condition was not significant (F < 1), indicating that males and
females did not differ significantly in the amount of embarrassment they reported. The
mean sums of self-reported embarrassment for the Leary et al. (1996) study, Study 1, and
Study 3 are displayed in Table 9. As in the previous studies, a series of planned contrasts
was conducted. In order to most accurately test the prediction that individuals who have
had the opportunity to publicly express their embarrassment should subsequently report
less embarrassment than those whose embarrassment remains private, the embarrassment
scores of those in the public-expression condition were compared to the scores of
participants in the private- and no-expression conditions whose feelings remained
unknown to the researcher (contrast coefficients = -2, +1, +1). The results o f this test
were not reported by Leary and colleagues, but as in Study 1, the results were not
significant, F(l,87) = 1.33,p > .05. Next, participants in the public-expression condition
whose feelings were known by the researcher were compared to participants in the no
expression condition whose feelings were unknown to the researcher (contrast
coefficients = -1, 0, +1). Consistent with the findings of Leary and colleagues and Study
1,

participants who did not have the opportunity to convey their embarrassment to the
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researcher reported being more embarrassed than participants whose feelings were known
to the researcher, F ( l, 8 8 ) = 4.58, p < .05.
As suggested by the pattern of results shown in Table 9, an additional planned
contrast (contrast coefficients = 0 , - 1 , + 1 ) demonstrated that the embarrassment scores in
the private-expression condition were significantly different from the scores in the no
expression condition, F ( l, 8 8 ) = 5.21 >P< .05. This replicates the findings of Study 1 and
differs from the finding o f Leary et al. (1996) that the private-expression condition
differed from neither the public- nor the no-expression conditions. A final contrast
(contrast coefficients = - 1 , + 1 , 0 ) showed that the private-expression condition did not
differ from the public-expression condition, F ( l, 8 8 ) = .02,p > .05. This last result also
mirrors the results found in Study 1 and the Leary et al. (1996) study. In Study 3, as in
Study 1, the mean embarrassment scores in the public and private-expression conditions
look virtually identical.
Domain-Specific Self-Esteem and the Expression o f Embarrassment
As in Study 1, the second major goal of Study 3 was to test whether specific
domains of self-esteem were more predictive o f embarrassment than was global SE. In
order to accomplish this, the four domain-specific SE scales, global SE, condition, and
sex (males =

-1

and females = + 1 ) were entered into a regression equation predicting

embarrassment on the final questionnaire. Two orthogonal contrasts were entered into
each regression equation to account for the condition variable: Condition Contrast 1
(contrast coefficients = +2, -1,-1) and Condition Contrast 2 (contrast coefficients = 0, +1,
-1). The regression coefficients for each variable are presented in Table 10. As in Study
1, Condition Contrast 2 emerged as a significant predictor (P = -.21

.05). However,
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the improved measure of status did emerge as a significant predictor o f embarrassment (P
= -.37, p < .01), as did global SE (p = -.29,p < .05). This analysis offered no support for
the hypothesis that domain-specific SEs would be better predictors of embarrassment
than global SE. Recall that in the present study it was hypothesized, based on the findings
from Study 1, that if any domain emerged as a predictor o f embarrassment, that domain
would be dominance. Instead, as was hypothesized in Study 1, status emerged as a
significant inverse predictor. This finding makes sense in light of previous correlational
studies that found a similar inverse relationship between status and embarrassment
(Buttermore, 2003).
From the standpoint of Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (2001) theory of domain-specific
SE, it is somewhat troubling that global SE remained a significant predictor of
embarrassment in this multiple regression. It is possible that the strength of global SE as a
predictor despite the inclusion of several domain-specific SEs in the regression equation
is due to another domain of SE that has not been explicitly measured in our model.
Perhaps if domains such as social inclusion, between- or within-group competition, or
morality had been explicitly measured as part of the current study, this effect of global SE
would disappear. In order to further explore the predictive power of global SE and status,
I studied the moderating effect of each type o f SE in an individual regression equation.
Domain-specific Self-esteems as Moderators o f the Leary et al. (1996) Findings
As in Study 1, each of the domain-specific SE scales was mean-centered and
entered individually into a regression equation containing the scale scores from the other
domain-specific SE measures, as well as contrast-coded variables representing condition,
sex, the interaction of sex and the domain of SE, and the interaction of condition and the
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domain of SE. Two orthogonal contrasts were entered into each regression equation to
account for the condition variable: Condition Contrast 1 (contrast coefficients = +2, -1,
-1) and Condition Contrast 2 (contrast coefficients = 0, +1, -1). As explained in Study 1,
the interaction o f Condition Contrast 1 and each of the mean-centered domains of SE
assesses the degree to which individuals’ SE in that domain is related to the relief they
felt after having the opportunity to convey their embarrassment to others.
For each of the multiple regression equations, the only significant predictors to
emerge were Condition Contrast 2, status, and global SE. Table 11 presents the results
from the multiple regression including the dominance interaction terms, which was the
regression equation of primary interest in Study 1. The pattern of results found in Study 1
differs greatly from the pattern found in this study. As previously revealed by the planned
contrasts, the significance of Condition 2 as a predictor in the multiple regression
equations indicated that the private-expression condition differed significantly from the
no-expression condition. However, these results fail to replicate the results from Study 1
that the interaction of dominance and condition was a significant predictor of
embarrassment, with highly dominant individuals reporting more embarrassment in the
private- and no-expression conditions and less embarrassment after having a chance to
share their emotions in the public-expression condition. The Dominance * Condition
Contrast 1 interaction failed to even approach significance (p = .10,/? = .33) in Study 3,
whereas the effect in Study 1 was quite strong (p = -.56 ,p < .01). As shown in Figure 2,
though not significant, the pattern of results for the Dominance x Condition Contrast 1
interaction in Study 3 is in the opposite direction as the pattern found in Study 1.
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There are several possible reasons for the failure of Study 3 to replicate Study 1.
First, it is important to note that the status, dominance, and prestige scales were altered
from Study 1 to Study 3. It is certainly possible that the changes in the patterns of results
are due to the changes in the predictor variables. However, the revised scales used in
Study 3 contained all of the items comprising the three subscales in Study 1, making it
possible to do a reanalysis of the data from Study 3 using the less reliable versions of the
scales as was done in Study 1. This approach revealed findings virtually identical to the
findings using the revised version. In other words, the pattern of results in Study 3 looks
the same regardless of whether the old or new versions of the status, dominance, and
prestige subscales were used.
Another potential problem with the experiment comes from anecdotal evidence as
reported by the five experimenters involved in data collection. Upon entering the lab,
several participants asked questions such as, “Is this the study where I have to sing?”
Study 3 was conducted during the spring semester immediately following the semester
during which Study 1 was conducted. It appears that some of the students who were
involved in Study 1 shared information about the experimental manipulation with
students who later participated in Study 3. Although attempts were made by the
experimenters to make note of those students who knew about the study prior to their
participation and subsequently remove the tainted data, there is no way of knowing
whether all students who were aware of the experimental task were excluded from the
study. Consequently, there is no way to test whether those with prior knowledge differed
significantly from naive participants in their reactions to the embarrassing task.
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The finding that it was the status scale, rather than the dominance scale, that
moderated the condition effects as reported by Leary and colleagues (1996) is perhaps
not as close to a complete failure to replicate Study 1 as it may at first seem. As discussed
at the end of Study 2, it is possible that the revised status scale is actually a measure of
submissiveness, rather than a measure of status. It has been argued that submissiveness
and dominance do not represent opposite ends of the same continuum, but the two
constructs are certainly more closely related to each other than is either to prestige. If the
status subscale does represent a measure of submissiveness, it is important to note that in
both Study 1 and Study 3, it was dominance and submissiveness, rather than prestige, that
were related to embarrassment.

53-

GENERAL DISCUSSION
With these three studies, I attempted to address three research questions. I found
some support for the conclusions drawn from the Leary et al. (1996) study, that
participants who had a prior opportunity to express their embarrassment to the researcher
reported less embarrassment than those whose embarrassment remained private.
However, some question remains as to whether Leary and colleagues tested the
hypothesis most appropriate for their intended research question. Second, I found mixed
support for the idea that domain-specific self-esteems are better predictors of the reaction
to an embarrassing situation than is global SE. Finally, I found some support for the
hypothesis that domain-specific SE moderates the effect reported by Leary and
colleagues, but it remains unclear whether dominance is the most important predictor.
Replication o f the Leary et al. (1996) Study
I failed in both Study 1 and Study 3 to replicate the finding from the Leary et al.
(1996) study that those participants in the private-expression condition reported levels of
embarrassment between the high levels reported by those in the no-expression condition
and the low levels reported in the public-expression condition, but did not differ
significantly from either condition. In both Study 1 and Study 3 ,1 found that participants
reported levels o f embarrassment that were virtually equivalent to the levels reported in
the public-expression condition. These two studies showed that participants who had the
chance to either share their embarrassment with the researcher or had the opportunity to
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record their feelings on paper reported significantly less embarrassment than those who
did not have any opportunity to express their feelings.
I attempted to address the failure to replicate Leary and colleagues’ (1996)
findings in Study 1 by improving the private-expression condition in the Study 3. As part
of the latter study, every effort was made to ensure that participants in the privateexpression condition were aware that the researchers had no way of matching their
responses on the initial questionnaire to the participants’ responses on the final
questionnaires. However, further examination of the mean embarrassment scores reported
in each condition in the three studies suggests that the differences between the Leary et
al. study and the present two studies could lie in the public-expression condition (Table
9). Leary et al. reported a mean embarrassment score on the public-expression condition
of M = 18.9, whereas the means in the same condition in Studies 1 and 3 were higher at
M = 24.7 and M = 27.5 respectively. The range of these mean scores ( 8 .6 ) is larger than
the ranges between the three studies in both the private- (3.6) and no- (4.3) expression
conditions. In other words, participants in the Leary et al. study reported being less
embarrassed after having the opportunity to share their feelings with the researcher than
did participants in the present two studies. In fact, participants in Study 1 and Study 3
here were no less embarrassed after the researcher examined their answers to the initial
questionnaire than were participants whose responses were not examined by the
researcher.
These results therefore offer only limited support for the theory that individuals
are motivated to convey their embarrassment to others as a way to decrease their
discomfort. Rather, they seem to suggest that publicly expressing embarrassment offers
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no more relief than simply recording embarrassment in writing. Pennebaker (1990) has
conducted many studies which investigate the effect of narrative writing on physical
well-being. His work has consistently demonstrated that individuals who document their
aversive experiences suffer fewer long-term psychological hardships as a result of those
events. While offering support for the idea that writing about negative feelings helps to
relieve discomfort, this research is only tangentially related to the present studies.
Pennebaker’s work examines diary-like writing that requires in-depth processing of the
emotions, whereas participants in the present study merely rated their emotions inasmuch
as they were summed up by five adjectives. Nonetheless, the present studies suggest that
even quickly considering the nature of the current emotional state can serve to alleviate
emotional discomfort.
It is also possible that the nature of the public-expression condition might have
caused participants in that condition to feel violated, rather than relieved, when the
experimenter examined their responses. If the participants assumed that their responses to
the initial questionnaire would remain anonymous, they would undoubtedly have been
shocked when the researcher examined their responses. Perhaps this contributed to the
participants’ negative emotional states, and prevented any relief that could have come as
a result of the public disclosure. As a post hoc test of this explanation, a one-way
ANOVA was conducted for each of the two studies, with condition predicting calmness
(Item 7 on the final questionnaire). In Study 1, there was an effect of condition, F(2,
= 4.01 ,p < .05, such that participants in the public (M = 7.43) and private (M = 1.21)
expression conditions reported feeling calmer than participants in the no-expression
condition (.M = 5.68). The same was true for Study 3, F(2, 87) = 2.51,p < .05.

88)
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Participants in the public (M= 7.27) and private (M= 7.00) expression conditions felt
calmer than participants in the no-expression condition (M = 5.57). Thus, it appears that
having one’s responses examined by an experimenter did not increase negative arousal.
In support of Pennebaker (1990), simply recording information about a negative
emotional experience appeared to have a calming effect.
The Predictive Power o f Domain-Specific SE
The results of Study 1 supported the prediction that domain-specific self-esteems
would predict the tendency to express the emotions to others. It was found that more
dominant individuals reported significantly less embarrassment after being given a prior
opportunity to convey their feelings publicly than did less dominant individuals. In fact,
more dominant individuals mirrored the pattern found by Leary et al. (1996), in which
publicly conveying embarrassment led to significantly less embarrassment than either
writing about that embarrassment or having no opportunity to express one’s feelings.
Among less dominant individuals, being given a chance to publicly express the emotions
did far less to relieve embarrassment. There was little difference between the means in
the public and private/no-expression conditions, suggesting that less dominant individuals
continued to be embarrassed even after being given a chance to share their emotions with
the experimenter.
However, the results of Study 3 are very different from the results of Study 1,
despite the fact that Study 3 was designed as a replication. In Study 3, dominance was n o t.
a significant predictor of embarrassment, and the Dominance x Condition interaction was
not significant. The only self-esteem variables that emerged as significant predictors of
embarrassment were status and global self-esteem. Judging by the number of participants
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who had prior knowledge of the experimental manipulation coming into Study 3, it seems
probable that the results of the second study should be called, into question, and an
additional attempt should be made to replicate the dominance effects found in Study 1.
Dominant individuals, who use force to attain status, need to be more concerned
than prestigious individuals about the ramifications of embarrassment-inducing actions.
Whereas prestigious individuals can remain secure in the knowledge that their social
inclusion, which comes as a result of their unique skills and talents, is not threatened by a
minor social offense such as singing badly, dominant individuals must be concerned
about any and all threats to their social standing. Furthermore, the significant drop seen in
the levels of embarrassment reported by dominant individuals once their feelings, as
reported in the initial questionnaire, were observed by the researcher, could be an attempt
at damage control. If the individual reported high levels of embarrassment in the initial
questionnaire, but never expected those levels to be viewed by the researcher, the lower
embarrassment ratings in the public-expression condition could be seen as the dominant
individual’s attempt to say, “I wasn’t really as negatively affected by this singing task as
you might think based on my previous answers.” Perhaps in the eyes of a highly
dominant individual, the best strategy for ensuring that a weakness is not exploited, is to
deny that the weakness ever existed.
Limitations and Future Directions
These three studies have several notable weaknesses that must be addressed in
any attempt to understand their implications. Studies 1 and 3 relied on several new
measures of domain-specific SE and their predictive value. Study 2 demonstrated that
both the dominance and prestige subscales of the SSSS are reliable measures, but the
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status scale was not as reliable. All three of these subscales need to be validated against
other related scales. It is especially important to test whether the status subscale is
actually assessing status, or whether makes better theoretical sense to think of the scale as
measuring submissiveness.
As originally designed by Leary and colleagues (1996), this methodology was
meant to investigate whether individuals who have done something embarrassing are
motivated to share their emotions with others. However, the word motivation seems a bit
misleading when applied to the procedure used in these studies. Participants had no
choice as to the strategy they used following an embarrassing predicament. In the publicexpression condition, the researcher examined the participants’ responses to the initial
questionnaire, whereas in the private-expression condition, the participants were
instructed to write down their feelings, but not to communicate them to the researcher.
This is more a controlled study of individuals’ reactions to having their feelings
examined by an observer, rather than of a participant’s motivation to share those feelings.
Future studies should investigate whether or not participants choose to convey their
emotions to the researcher in this setting, and if so, how they choose to do so. Many of
the participants who were eliminated from the study were excluded because they made
jokes about their singing, or took some other measure to communicate their discomfort.
Choosing to use such a strategy to share embarrassment would probably also be closely
tied to the domains of status, dominance, and prestige.
These studies looked at only one type of verbal remedial strategy, expressing
embarrassment to someone else. Future research could investigate how other remedial
strategies influence the subjective experience of embarrassment. For example, Study 2 of
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the Leary et al. (1996) article investigated how individuals reacted to having their levels
of facial flushing noticed by the researcher. If, as proposed by Leary and Meadows
(1991), blushing is an involuntary response indicating humility, which is meant to
mitigate potential negative evaluations of the blusher by others and to ensure that the
individual remains socially included, then it seems likely that differences in dominance
and prestige would be related to blushing. As shown in the studies by Sueda and
Wiseman (1992) and Fink and Walker (1977) individuals use different remedial
strategies such as humor and apologizing, depending on their social status in an
interaction. It would be interesting to test whether high- and low-status, dominance, or
prestige, individuals differ in their preferred remedial strategy.
The present studies investigated how public displays of embarrassment influence
the feelings and behaviors of the person who had completed an embarrassing task. In
future studies it would be interesting to study how the same behaviors influence the
observer of the social transgression. For example, observers of embarrassing actions
might react more or less favorably to individuals who demonstrate verbal or nonverbal
displays of their feelings, based on the transgressors social status. Perhaps the so-called
motivation to convey embarrassment to others is a misguided strategy. It could be that it
takes more than a confession to convince an onlooker that an embarrassing event need
not reflect negatively on the offending party.
It appears that privately recording feelings of embarrassment does help to
decrease discomfort, but it remains unclear whether sharing these feelings with others is
an equally effective or (as suggested by Leary and colleagues) more effective strategy for
lessening that discomfort. However, the results of Study 1 suggest that those high and
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low in dominance differ in their reactions to having their feelings publicly
communicated. Whereas those high in dominance expressed less embarrassment after
their feelings were revealed to the researcher than they did if their feelings remained
private, those low in dominance reported similar levels of embarrassment whether their
feelings remained public or private. This finding suggests that an understanding of
domain-specific SE is important for predicting the expression of emotion following an
embarrassing event.
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TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS AMONG SELF-ESTEEM SCALES (STUDY 1)
SE scale

1

1. Global SE

-

2. Status
3. Dominance

4 9 **

2

3

4

-

.13

.35**

-

4. Prestige

.50**

.26*

.13

-

5. Mate Value

.43**

.18

.17

.48**

*p < .05. ** p < .01
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF SELF-REPORTED EMBARRASSMENT SCORES
FROM LEARY ET AL. (1996) AND STUDY 1
Expression o f Embarrassment
Public

Private

None

Leary et al. (1996)

18.9

23.5

29.8

Buttermore - Study 1

24.7

23.0

35.6

Note. Numbers reflect the sum of ratings on five items: embarrassed, nervous, foolish,
calm (reverse scored), and self-conscious.
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TABLE 3
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING EMBARRASSMENT
FROM DOMAIN-SPECIFIC SE (STUDY 1)
B

SEB

P

Dominance

-2.30

1.58

-.16

Prestige

-2.35

2.69

-.1 0

Status

-1.38

1.76

-.09

Mate Value

-1.73

1.47

-.14

Global SE

1.82

2.35

.1 0

Sex

-0 . 2 1

1.35

-.0 2

Condition 1 (+2, -1, -1)

-1.77

0.98

-.18

Condition 2 (0, +1, -1)

-6.65

1.66

40* **

Variable

Note. N = 91.
*** p < .001.
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TABLE 4
RESULTS FOR INTERACTION TERMS FROM SEPARATE
MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS (STUDY 1)
Interaction Term

B

SEB

P

Global SE x Condition

0.67

1.40

.05

Status x Condition

-1.31

1.16

-.1 2

Dominance x Condition

-3.47

1.24

-.30**

Prestige x Condition

2.59

1.79

.15

Mate value x Condition

1.54

0.94

.18

Note. N = 91. Each row represents a separate multiple regression in which the interaction
of one domain of SE and effects-coded condition (+2, -1,-1) was tested with the effects
of sex, condition, and each additional domain of SE controlled.
**p < .0 1 .
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TABLE 5

RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING
EMBARRASSMENT (STUDY 1)
B

SEB

P

Dominance

-3.43

1.60

-.23*

Condition 1 (+2, -1,-1)

-1.83

0.96

-.19

Condition 2 (0, +1, -1)

-6.34

1.63

- 38***

Dominance x Condition 1

-3.47

1.24

-.30**

Dominance x Condition 2

0.32

1.67

.0 2

Status

-1.87

1.74

-.1 2

Prestige

- 1 .8 8

2 .6 8

-.08

Mate Value

-2.51

1.49

- .2 0

Global SE

1.67

2.37

.1 0

Sex

0.41

1.35

.03

Sex x Condition 1

1.26

1 .0 1

.13

Sex x Condition 2

0 .1 1

1.63

.0 1

Variable

Note. A =91.
* p < .05. * * /? < . 01. * * * p < .001.
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TABLE 6

THREE FACTOR OBLIMIN ROTATION OF SSSS SUBSCALES (STUDY 2)
Item
1.
2

I sometimes do favors for people to get on their
good side. (R)*

. I tend to dominate social situations.*

1

2

3

.05

.16

.49

.49

.57

-.18

3.

Members of my peer group respect and admire
me.*

.73

.06

-.2 1

4.

Others believe they can push me around. (R)

-.41

-.28

.61

5.

I defer to others when decisions have to be made.
(R)*

-.26

-.36

.48

6.

I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my
way.*

.08

.63

-.08

7.

Others do not value my opinion. (R)*

-.60

-.0 2

.35

8.

People often 'let it slide' when I fail to meet my
obligations.

-.07

.1 0

.37

9.

I enjoy having control over others.*

.14

.66

.2 0

10.

I feel inferior to members of my peer group. (R)*

-.61

-.07

.56

11.

I must admit that I try to see what others think
before I take a stand. (R)*

-.1 0

-.13

.62

12.

Others recognize me for my contributions to my
social groups.

.65

.18

-.09

13.

I do not like to give orders. (R)*

-.28

-.59

.23

14.

__

Members of my peer group do not want to be like
/n\j.

-.57

-.07

.2 0

6

15.

It is pretty easy for people to win arguments with
me. (R)*

-.35

-.29

.50

16.

I don't mind compromising with other people. (R)*

-.0 1

-.43

.09

17.

I have high status in my social groups.*

.77

.26

-.23

18.

I am easily intimidated by dominant individuals.
(R)*

-.39

-.32

.64

19.

Others know it is better to let me have my way.

.2 2

.62

.1 0

20.

There are some matters on which I am considered
an expert by others.*

.47

.22

.14

21.

I have high rank in my social groups.

.78

.29

-.2 1

22.

I demand respect from members of my peer group.*

.55

.39

-.13

23.

It makes me uncomfortable when others publicly
praise me.

-.1 1

-.09

.14

24.

Other find my advice helpful.

.57

.0 2

-.15

25.

I have access to resources that others do not.

.40

.16

.17

-.19

-.53

.05

26.

I do not enjoy having authority over other people.

(R)

27.

My unique talents and abilities are recognized by
others.

.72

-.0 1

-.08

28.

Others do not second guess my choices.

.44

.04

-.1 1

-.06

-.36

.13

29.

I do not mind taking orders or being told what to do.

(R)

30.

When I am being introduced, I don't like the person to
make lengthy comments about what I have done.

-.1 0

-.16

.15

31.

My opinions hold greater weight relative to others' in
my social group.

.51

.40

-.03

32.

I try to control others rather than permit them to
control me.

.28

.75

.0 1

33.

I don't have a forceful or dominant personality. (R)

-.29

-.61

.37

6

34.

If I have done something well, I make sure I call it
to other people’s attention. (R)

.08

.25

.47

35.

People seem naturally to turn to me when decisions
have to be made.

.58

.35

-.32

36.

I often try to get my own way regardless of what
others may want.

.08

.64

.20

37.

I have gained distinction and social prestige among
my peers.

.79

.25

-.11

38.

I am held in high esteem by those I know.

.82

.10

-.19

39.

I believe I have to fight my way to the top.*

-.04

.45

.18

40.

Others consider what I will think before making
choices.

.58

.22

-.06

Note. The 28 items that were selected as being the best items for the three subscales are
presented in bold. The bolded factor loading indicates the subscale to which those
respective items belong.
* Indicates items from the earlier versions of the SSSS subscales.
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TABLE 7
FOUR FACTOR OBLIMIN ROTATION OF SSSS SUBSCALES (STUDY 2)
Item
1.
2

I sometimes do favors for people to get on
their good side. (R)*

. I tend to dominate social situations.*

1

2

3

4

.05

.2 1

.47

.09

.49

.55

-.2 0

-.13

3.

Members of my peer group respect and
admire me.*

.73

.0 2

-.17

-.15

4.

Others believe they can push me around.
(R)

-.41

-.2 1

.59

.23

5.

I defer to others when decisions have to be
made. (R)*

-.27

-.32

.50

.1 2

6.

I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get
my way.*

.08

.61

-.1 1

-.14

7.

Others do not value my opinion. (R)*

-.60

.03

.31

.19

8.

People often 'let it slide' when I fail to meet my
obligations.

-.07

.18

.29

.39

9.

I enjoy having control over others.*

.13

.64

.2 0

-.27

10.

I feel inferior to members of my peer group.
(R>*

-.61

.0 0

.52

.2 0

11.

I must admit that I try to see what others
think before I take a stand. (R)*

-.1 1

-.1 0

.65

-.05

12.

Others recognize me for my contributions to
my social groups.

.65

.14

-.04

-.25

13.

I do not like to give orders. (R)*

-.27

-.53

.2 0

.45

14.

Members of my peer group do not want to
be like me. (R)*

-.57

-.04

.17

.1 2
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15.

It is pretty easy for people to win arguments
with me. (R)*

-.35

-.24

.49

.20

16.

I don't mind compromising with other
people. (R)*

-.01

-.45

.15

-.13

17.

I have high status in my social groups.*

.77

.24

-.23

-.04

18.

I am easily intimidated by dominant
individuals. (R)*

-.39

-.26

.64

.17

19.

Others know it is better to let me have my
way.

.22

.64

.04

.06

20.

There are some matters on which I am
considered an expert by others.*

.47

.22

.15

-.07

21.

I have high rank in my social groups.

.78

.26

-.21

-.06

22.

I demand respect from members of my peer
group.*

.55

.36

-.11

-.18

23.

It makes me uncomfortable when others
publicly praise me.

-.10

-.01

.02

.64

24.

Other find my advice helpful.

.57

-.03

-.09

-.27

25.

I have access to resources that others do not.

.39

.15

.20

-.17

26.

I do not enjoy having authority over other
people. (R)

-.18

-.46

-.01

.54

27.

My unique talents and abilities are
recognized by others.

.72

-.04

-.03

-.17

28.

Others do not second guess my choices.

.44

.04

-.11

.05

29.

I do not mind taking orders or being told what
to do. (R)

-.07

-.39

.22

-.27

30.

When I am being introduced, I don't like the
person to make lengthy comments about what I
have done.

-.09

-.09

.06

.54

31.

My opinions hold greater weight relative to
others' in my social group.

.52

.43

-.09

.21

1

32.

I try to control others rather than permit
them to control me.

.28

.75

-.04

-.06

33.

I don't have a forceful or dominant
personality. (R)

-.29

-.56

.38

.20

34.

If I have done something well, I make sure I
call it to other people's attention. (R)

.07

.27

.48

-.11

35.

People seem naturally to turn to me when
decisions have to be made.

.59

.32

-.33

-.08

36.

I often try to get my own way regardless of
what others may want.

.08

.67

.14

.05

37.

I have gained distinction and social prestige
among my peers.

.79

.23

-.11

-.04

38.

I am held in high esteem by those I know.

.82

.07

-.17

-.05

39.

I believe I have to fight my way to the top.*

-.04

.47

.14

.01

40.

Others consider what I will think before
making choices.

.59

.21

-.05

-.07

Note. The 28 items that were selected as being the best items for the three subscales are
presented in bold. The bolded factor loading indicates the subscale to which those
respective items belong.
* Indicates items from the earlier versions of the SSSS subscales.
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TABLE

8

CORRELATIONS AMONG SELF-ESTEEM SCALES (STUDY 3)
SE scale

1

1. Global SE

-

2. Status

3 7 **

3

2

-

.08

3 4 **

4. Prestige

4 7 **

.36**

32**

5. Mate Value

4 9 **

**

.23*

3. Dominance

*p < .05. **p < .01

4

49

-

-

.51**
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TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF SELF-REPORTED EMBARRASSMENT SCORES
FROM LEARY ET AL. (1996) AND STUDIES 1 & 3
Expression of Embarrassment
Public

Private

None

Leary et al. (1996)

18.9

23.5

29.8

Buttermore - Study 1

24.7

23.0

35.6

Buttermore - Study 3

27.5

27.1

34.1

Note. Numbers reflect the sum of ratings on five items: embarrassed, nervous, foolish,
calm (reverse scored), and self-conscious.
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TABLE 10
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING EMBARRASSMENT
FROM DOMAIN-SPECIFIC SE (STUDY 3)
Variable

B

SEB

(3

Dominance

1.51

1.75

.09

Prestige

0.97

2.46

.05

Status

-5.74

1.79

_ 3 7 **

Mate Value

1.38

1.33

.13

Global SE

-4.62

1.83

-.29*

Sex

-1.99

1 .1 2

-.16

Condition 1 (+2, -1,-1)

-0.44

0 .8 6

-.05

Condition 2 (0, +1, -1)

-3.13

1.41

-.2 1 *

Note. N = 91.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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TABLE 11
RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING
EMBARRASSMENT (STUDY 3)
Variable

B

SEB

P

Dominance

1.83

1.81

.11

Condition 1 (+2, -1,-1)

-0.27

0.89

-.03

Condition 2 (0, +1, -1)

-3.20

1.45

-.22*

Dominance x Condition 1

1.22

1.26

.10

Dominance x Condition 2

1.28

1.80

.07

Status

-5.89

1.86

-.38**

Prestige

1.11

2.53

.05

Mate Value

1.61

1.37

.15

Global SE

-4.88

1.91

-.31*

Sex

-1.96

1.15

-.16

Sex x Condition 1

.02

.82

.00

Sex x Condition 2

.39

1.45

.03

Note. N = 91.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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FIGURE 1
EMBARRASSMENT SCORES AS A FUNCTION OF
CONDITION AND DOMINANCE (STUDY 1)
35 i

Embarrassment Sum

30 -

25 -

20

-

- Low Dom inance (-1 SD)
—High Dom inance (+1 SD)

Public

Private/No
Expression Condition

77

FIGURE 2
EMBARRASSMENT SCORES AS A FUNCTION OF
CONDITION AND DOMINANCE (STUDY 3)

35

Embarrassment Sum

30

25

20

-

Low Dom inance (-1 SD)
•High Dom inance (+1 SD)

15
Private/No

Public
Expression Condition
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APPENDIX A

VERBATIM SCRIPT
Hi. My name is [Nicole Buttermore/ other researcher] and I am collecting data for a masters
thesis project. I need your help to complete a study of the effect of music on emotion that will
take approximately 30 minutes.
You will complete several questionnaires, then follow an instructional audiotape. Your responses
to the audiotape will be recorded, but your name will not be associated with the recording. Next,
you will fill out a few more questionnaires in which you will be asked about your reactions to the
audiotape. I will explain the study more fully afterward and you can obtain the final results if you
wish. I would like to take this time to assure you that your answers will be completely anonymous
and that you may terminate your participation at any time. Also, please do not write your name or
any other identifying information on any of the questionnaires.
OK, if you are willing to participate, please read the following consent form (Appendix B). This
form indicates that I have explained this all to you and that you are willing to participate. Please
sign the blank line and print your name below your signature so I can be sure you get credit for
being here. I’ll be back in just a moment.
[Experimenter leaves to give participant a minute to review consent form. Experimenter returns.]

Thanks. [Collect consent form.] Here are several questionnaires. [Pass out Appendix C, D, & E.]
Please go through them fairly quickly, then flip your answers over on the desk and crack the door
to let me know you are finished. Then sit quietly until I come back. Don’t stop to think about any
one question too long —your first impressions and immediate reactions are what we want. Do
you have any questions? {Answer questions, if any.] Just crack the door when you are done, OK?
[.Participant completes questionnaire and cracks door.]

Okay. Please leave your questionnaires on the desk and follow me into the next room. Please
have a seat. I will now start the instructional audiotape and recording device. When instructed to
do so, please pick up the microphone and project your voice into it. I’m going to remain in the
room to make sure everything works smoothly, but please do not say anything to me unless I ask
you to. Do you have any questions?
{Experimenter remains in room while participant follows the taped instructions.]
Public expression condition:
Please open folder # 2 and complete that questionnaire. When you are done, please crack
the door to let me know you are finished. [Participant completes Appendix F].
Experimenter picks up and examines responses.] I’m going to take a quick look to see
how you felt during the task.
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Private expression condition:
Please open folder #2 and complete that questionnaire. When you are finished please fold
your answers and place them into this [envelope/sealed box], so that your answers remain
anonymous. Then crack the door to let me know you are finished. [Participant completes
Appendix F.]
No expression condition".
[Participant does not fill out Appendix F.]

Now, please complete this final questionnaire. [Give Appendix G.] Please note that I will be
examining your responses once you have finished. Again, please crack the door when you are
finished.
[Participant completes questionnaire.]
Public and Private expression conditions:
Now I just have two quick follow-up questions for you.
1. Following the singing task, were you asked to fill out a questionnaire that
asked you about how that musical exercise made you feel?
2. Did I look at your answers to that questionnaire?

Thanks so much! Those last questions weren’t meant to confuse you. They were just a
manipulation check. In case you are curious, here is what the study is about. I am interested in
the way people react to embarrassing situations. This is a replication of a study done several years
ago, in which people completed a singing task just like the one you did. Some people were then
given the opportunity to express their embarrassment to the researcher, whereas others were not.
The study found that people who were given the opportunity to express their embarrassment
subsequently expressed less embarrassment than did those people who thought the researcher was
unaware of their feelings. This finding suggests that people convey their embarrassment to others
as a way of repairing their social image and decreasing their own levels of embarrassment.
However, I believe that this effect may be different among individuals of high versus low status.
Status is just one of several types of domain-specific self-esteem that may influence how people
react to embarrassing situations. The questionnaire you completed at the beginning of the study
included several different measures of different kinds of self-esteem, and I am going to look at
the data to see which kinds are related to your subsequent feelings of embarrassment.
You should know that I did record your singing, but the tape will be erased. No one will ever hear
the recording. That was only a way to induce immediate feelings of embarrassment.
If you are interested in the results of the study, feel free to send an email to [me / Nicole
Buttermore]. [My email / her email address] is available on the experimetrix website as the
contact person for this experiment, or it’s very easy to remember: nrbutt@wm.edu.
Finally, I’d like to ask you not to say anything about this study to anyone else who might be a
participant in the future, as we will be collecting data for the next few weeks. Again, thanks very
much for helping me out.
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APPENDIX B
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT CONSENT FORM
In this study of the effects of music on emotion, conducted by Nicole Buttermore and Dr.
Lee Kirkpatrick, I understand that I will be asked to fill out a number of questionnaires
about my personality and self-perceptions. I also know that I will be asked to follow
instructions on an audiotape about making and appreciating music and that my responses
to the task will be recorded. I further understand that I will be asked personal questions
about myself, but I know that complete anonymity will be preserved and that my name
will not be associated with my responses or any result of this study. I know that I may
refuse to answer any question asked and that I may discontinue participation at any given
time. I further understand that upon completion of my participation I will be given a full
and complete explanation of this study and have the right to withdraw the use of my data
at that time. I am aware that I may report dissatisfactions with any aspect of this
experiment to the Psychology Department Chair (Dr. Larry Ventis, ext. 1-3897). I am
aware that I must be at least 18 years of age to participate. My signature below signifies
my voluntary participation in this study.

Signature

Date
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APPENDIX C
ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE
Indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement below by
writing a number between 1 and 7 in the space provided.
l=Strongly
disagree

2=Disagree

3=Slightly
disagree

4=Neutral

5=Slightly
agree

6=Agree

I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
I feel that I have a number o f good qualities.
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
I am able to do things as well as most other people.
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
I wish I could have more respect for myself.
I certainly feel useless at times.
At times I think I am no good at all.

7=Strongly
agree
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APPENDIX D
SELF-PERCEIVED MATING SUCCESS SCALE
Indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement below by
writing a number between 1 and 7 in the space provided.
I=Strongly
disagree

2=Disagree

3=Slightly
disagree

4=Neutral

5=Slightly
agree

6=Agree

Members of the opposite sex that I like, tend to like me back.
Members o f the opposite sex notice me.
I receive many compliments from members of the opposite sex.
Members of the opposite sex are not very attracted to me.
I receive sexual invitations from members of the opposite sex.
Members of the opposite sex are attracted to me.
I can have as many sexual partners as I choose.
I do not receive many compliments from members of the opposite sex.

7=Strongly
agree
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APPENDIX E

SELF-PERCEIVED SOCIAL STATUS SCALE (STUDY 1)
Indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement below by
writing a number between I and 7 in the space provided.
l=Strongly
disagree

2=Disagree

3=Slightly
disagree

4=Neutral

5=Slightly
agree

6=Agree

I sometimes do favors for people to get on their good side.
Members of my peer group respect and admire me.
I defer to others when decisions have to be made.
Others do not value my opinion.
I feel inferior to members of my peer group.
Members of my peer group do not want to be like me.
I have high status in my social groups.
There are some matters on which I am considered an expert by others.
I own many things that others wish they had.
People often “let it slide” when I fail to meet my obligations.
I must admit that I try to see what others think before I take a stand.
It is pretty easy for people to win arguments with me.
Taking charge comes easily to me.
I tend to dominate social situations.
I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.
I enjoy having control over others.
I like to give orders.

7=Strongly
agree
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I do not like to compromise.
I believe I have to fight my way to the top.
I demand respect from members of my peer group.
I am easily intimidated by dominant individuals.
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APPENDIX F
INITIAL EMBARRASSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONDITIONS
Please rate how you felt during the music exercise using the scale below:
1 = Not at all
2 = Slightly
3 = Somewhat
4 = Moderately
5 = Quite a bit
6 = Very
7 = Extremely
_______ Silly
-

Bored
Embarrassed
Happy
Foolish
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APPENDIX G

FOLLOW-UP EMBARRASSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Please rate how you feel at this time by marking an X anywhere along each line. The
researcher will look over your answers once you have completed this questionnaire.
I. Nervous

not at all

very

moderately

slightly

extremely

2. Self-conscious
•

not at all

•
•

•

slightly

moderately

very

extremely

slightly

moderately

very

extremely

slightly

moderately

very

extremely

very

extremely

3. Hostile

not at all
4. Foolish

not at all
5. Depressed

•

not at all

slightly

•
•

•

moderately

6. Embarrassed
:
not at all

:
slightly

•

•
•

*

•

•

•

#

J

moderately

very

extremely

moderately

very

extremely

7. Calm

not at all

slightly
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